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This paper is motivated by the strong cor-
relation between changes in household debt 
and in aggregate employment across regions of 
the United States during the Great Recession. 
As Mian and Sufi (2014) have documented, 
regions of the United States where the decrease 
in household debt was most pronounced were 
also regions where the decline in employment 
was most severe.
This paper documents that the drop in employ-
ment in the regions that have experienced the 
largest decrease in household debt is mostly 
accounted for by changes in the labor wedge (deviations from a static  consumption-leisure 
choice) as opposed to changes in real wages. We 
then argue that such a pattern is consistent with 
a  Bewley-Aiyagari model in which agents face 
uninsurable idiosyncratic risks and can borrow 
up to a fraction of the value of their homes. As 
long as consumption and housing enter the utility 
function in a  non-separable form, a tightening of 
debt constraints acts like an implicit tax on labor. 
Whether this implicit tax is sufficiently large to 
generate a drop in employment depends on the 
strength of the wealth effects on labor supply. 
Our main finding is that if wealth effects are suf-
ficiently weak, then the model implies a reduc-
tion in employment following a tightening of debt 
constraints even in the absence of price and wage 
rigidities or constraints on monetary policy.
I. Evidence
Figures 1 and 2 show the  cross-sectional 
relationship between changes in employment, 
household debt, and house prices between 2007 
and 2010. The positive association between 
these variables is quite evident in the figures.
We next argue that distortions in the 
 consumption-leisure choice partly account for 
these patterns. To do so, consider a consumer 
who maximizes  U (c, n)  = u (c) − v (n) sub-
ject to a budget constraint, where after-tax real 
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Figure 1. Employment and Household Debt
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Figure 2. Employment and House Prices
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labor income is  (1 − τ) wn . Here,  w is the real 
wage,  τ is a tax on labor, and  c and  n are con-
sumption and employment. We can recover the 
labor wedge  1 − τ from the  first-order condi-
tion  1 − τ = − U n / (w U c ) . In Figures 3 and 4, 
we graph the labor wedge in a  cross section of 
US states against changes in debt for standard 
preferences,  U (c, n)  =   c 1−σ  _ 1 − σ −   n 
1+1/ν  _ 
1 + 1/ν , and 
the preferences in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and 
Huffman (1988)—hereafer, GHH—preferences 
U (c, n)  =  1 _ 1 − σ(c −   n 1+1/ν  _1+1/ν ) 
1−σ
 . In Figures 5 
and 6, we graph the change in the labor wedge 
for both preferences against the change in 
employment.
To interpret these figures, manipulate the 
 first-order condition for labor supply for GHH 
preferences to decompose the change in employ-
ment into the change in the labor wedge and in 
the real wage as
 ln (  n 2010  _ n 2007 ) = ν ln ( 1 −  τ 2010  _1 −  τ 2007 ) + ν ln ( 
 w 2010  _ w 2007 ) . 
The decomposition for standard preferences 
is similar except that it has an additional term 
involving the change in consumption. (See 
online Appendix for details.) The slopes of the (weighted) regression lines in Figures 5 and 
6 are 2.43 and 0.82, respectively, both signifi-
cant. Taken together, Figures 3 to 6 show that 
the employment decline was associated with 
a worsening of the labor wedge rather than 
just with a change in real wages and, possibly, 
consumption.
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Figure 3. Wedge and Debt (Standard)
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Figure 4. Wedge and Debt (GHH)
Figure 5. Wedge and Employment (Standard)
Figure 6. Wedge and Employment (GHH)
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II. Model
We consider a closed economy populated by 
a continuum of agents who face uninsurable 
idiosyncratic labor market risks. The model we 
study focuses on the role that borrowing con-
straints linking borrowing to house values have 
in shaping the dynamics of the labor wedge. (In 
related work, Guerrie and Lorenzoni 2015 study 
a model similar to ours with exogenous borrow-
ing constraints.) We first describe the house-
hold’s problem, the equilibrium, and then derive 
the optimal decision rules of the household.
A. Household’s Problem
An agent’s labor market income in a given 
period is  w t  z it  n it , where  w t is the wage expressed 
in units of the consumption good,  z it is the 
agent’s efficiency of labor, and  n it is the agent’s 
labor supply;  i ∈  [0, 1] indexes agents. The 
agent’s problem is
  max 
 
 
 
 ∑ 
t=0
∞
  β t V (g ( c it ,  h it ) ,  n it ) , 
subject to a budget constraint,
   c it +  q t ( h it+1 −  h it )  +  b it+1 
    =  w t  z it  n it +  (1 +  r t−1 ) b it , 
and a borrowing constraint,
  b it+1 ≥ −θ q t  h it+1 , 
which specifies that the maximal loan, 
 − b it+1 , an agent can take in period  t is a frac-
tion  θ of the value of the house,  q t  h it+1 , that 
the agent has purchased in period  t . We refer 
to  θ as the maximal  loan-to-value ratio. Here 
c it is the agent’s  nondurable consumption and 
h it is the flow of housing services consumed, 
assumed proportional to the housing stock, and 
g (c, h)  =  ( c  ε−1 _ε  +  η  1 _ε h  ε−1 _ε  ) 
 ε _ ε−1
 , the composite 
consumption good, is an aggregator of con-
sumption and housing services with an elasticity 
of substitution  ε . Agents take as given the time 
paths of house prices,  q t , and interest rates,  r t . 
Here agent i supplies  z it  n it efficiency units of 
labor in period t, where  z it is idiosyncratic across 
agents and evolves over time according to
  log  z it+1 =  ρ z log z it +  σ z  ϵ it+1 , 
with  ϵ it+1 is i.i.d. standard normal, so that agent  i 
supplies  z it  n it efficiency units of labor in period  t .
B. Equilibrium
The consumption good is produced by per-
fectly competitive firms with a technology that 
is linear in efficiency units of labor,  y t =  l t . 
Competition among firms implies that the real 
wage per efficiency units of labor is  w t = 1 . The 
housing stock is fixed at one so that  ∫    h it+1 di = 1 . 
Market clearing in asset and the labor markets 
imply that  ∫    b it+1 = 0 and  l t =  ∫    z it  n it di . There is 
no aggregate uncertainty in this economy. Below 
we study the  steady-state properties of the model 
as well as the  perfect-foresight transition dynam-
ics following a  one-time unanticipated decline in 
the maximal  loan-to-value ratio,  θ .
C. Decision Rules
We simplify the state variables in the analysis 
by assuming that agents can adjust their hous-
ing stock in period  t after the realization of their 
idiosyncratic efficiency,  z it . Under this assump-
tion, an agent’s financial position is summarized 
by the net worth
  a it =  b it +  q t−1  h it , 
and an agent’s period  t state is  ( a it ,  z it ) . The 
agent’s problem in recursive form is
 W t ( a it ,  z it ) =  max  a it+1 ,  c t ,  h t ,  n t  
 
 V ( c t ,  h t ,  n t )
+ β ∫ 
 z it+1 
 W t+1 ( a it+1 ,  z it+1 ) dF ( z it+1 |  z it ) , 
subject to the budget constraint
 c it +  u t  q t  h it +  a it+1 =  w t  z it  n it +  (1 +  r t−1 ) a it , 
and the borrowing constraint
  q t−1  h it ⩽  a it / (1 − θ) . 
Here  u t = (1 +  r t−1 ) q t−1 / q t − 1 is the user 
cost of housing: an increase in interest rates or 
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a house price depreciation makes houses rela-
tively more costly to own. Note that allowing 
agents to adjust their housing stock after the 
realization of  z it means that housing is chosen in 
a static fashion, just as  nondurable consumption, 
and the only dynamic choice is that of net worth, 
a it+1 .
The housing choice can be written as
  h it =  min   
 
[η ( u t  q t ) −ε  c it ,   a it  _ (1 − θ) q t−1 ] 
 = η [( u t +  μ it ) q t ] −ε  c it , 
where  μ it is the normalized multiplier on the bor-
rowing constraint and is positive for households 
with sufficiently low net worth.
The labor supply choice equates the marginal 
rate of substitution between labor,  n it , and the 
composite consumption good,  g t , to the real 
wage in composite consumption good units,
  − V n,it / V g,it =  w t  z it / p it ,  
where  p it = {1 + η [( u t +  μ it ) q t ] 1−ε } 
 1 _ 
1−ε
 is the (shadow) composite price of the  consumption- 
housing aggregator and varies across house-
holds. This equation highlights the key force 
we focus on later, namely, the negative effect 
of tighter borrowing constraints on labor sup-
ply: agents who are more borrowing constrained 
have higher normalized multipliers,  μ it , and thus 
supply less labor than they would, absent the 
borrowing constraint.
Figure 7 summarizes this discussion by 
illustrating an agent’s consumption, hous-
ing, and employment choices for different 
values of net worth for standard preferences, 
V (g, n) =   g 1−σ  _1 − σ −   n 
1+1/ν  _ 
1 + 1/ν , and GHH prefer-
ences,  V (g, n)  =  1 _ 1 − σ(g −   n 1+1/ν  _ 1 + 1/ν) 
1−σ
 . With 
GHH preferences, there are no wealth effects 
on labor supply, so the poorest agents, namely 
those with the lowest assets, are relatively 
more borrowing constrained and, hence,  supply 
less labor. The GHH version of the model can 
therefore account, at least qualitatively, for the 
positive correlation between employment and 
household wealth (as proxied by changes in 
house prices) in Figure 2. Figure 7 also makes 
it clear that an increase in the amount of wealth 
inequality—a mean preserving spread in  a t —
would reduce labor supply in the economy with-
out wealth effects on labor supply, by raising 
the proportion of agents who are borrowing 
constrained.
III. Responses to a Tightening of Borrowing 
Constraints
We illustrate the mechanism discussed above 
using a simple quantitative example. We first 
discuss the parameter values we have used and 
then the response to a  one-time reduction in the 
maximal  loan-to-value ratio,  θ .
A. Calibration
The period is one year. We set the persistence 
of labor productivity as  ρ z = 0.79 and its vola-
tility as  σ z = 0.34 , in line with the literature. We 
set the Frisch elasticity of labor supply,  ν , equal 
to 1 and assume  ε = 1/σ = 1/2 . Clearly, the 
elasticity of substitution between consumption 
and housing  ε is critical for our results: reducing 
it amplifies the effect of borrowing constraints 
on employment, while raising it reduces this 
effect. Like earlier, we work with two types of 
preferences, standard and GHH. We set  θ equal 
to 0.80 in the initial steady state and choose the 
parameter governing the importance of hous-
ing in preferences as  η = 0.32 as well as the 
discount factor as  β = 0.88 , to ensure that the 
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Figure 7. Decision Rules versus Net Worth
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 housing-to-income ratio in the model is equal to 
2.2 and that the  risk-free rate is equal to 2 per-
cent, numbers in line with US evidence.
B. Transition Dynamics
Figure 8 shows how the economy evolves fol-
lowing a  one-time unanticipated reduction in  θ 
from 0.8 to 0.5.
The less interesting case is that with standard 
preferences. Here employment increases fol-
lowing a tightening of the borrowing constraint 
because, quantitatively, the wealth effect on 
labor supply emanating from the large drop in 
wealth overwhelms the effect of the  tightened 
borrowing constraint. Thus, there is a large 
increase in households’ labor supply, especially 
the poorest ones, who are now even more con-
strained in their borrowing. Over time such 
households save in order to relax their borrow-
ing constraints.
The case of interest is that with GHH prefer-
ences in which there are no such wealth effects. 
In this case, the tightened borrowing constraint 
leads to a reduction in the labor supply of the poor 
households. Here employment falls visibly after a 
credit tightening and never fully recovers. Output 
falls in both versions of the model, though much 
more in the economy with GHH preferences.
C. Matching US Wealth Inequality
As is well known, simple versions of the 
 Bewley-Aiyagari models like ours are  incapable 
of reproducing the large amount of wealth 
inequality observed in the data. For example, 
in our baseline model with GHH preferences, 
the ratio of debt to income is only equal to 
0.65, much lower than the 0.92 observed in 
the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 
data. Similarly, the ratio of the wealth of house-
holds in the  ninety-fifth percentile to that of the 
median household is equal to 15 in the data and 
only 7 in the model.
To address these discrepancies, we consider 
a greater wealth inequality version of the GHH 
model in which we allow agents to differ in their 
discount factors (we assume a  three-point dis-
tribution) and choose the dispersion in  discount 
factors to match moments of the net worth distri-
bution in the United States.1 This version is capa-
ble of replicating a much higher  debt-to-income 
ratio (0.81) as well as a ninety-fifth to fiftieth 
wealth ratio of 14, and thus is much closer to 
the data. In addition, a larger fraction of agents 
are constrained in this version of the model (39 
percent compared to 13 percent in the bench-
mark model). Figure 9 displays the responses 
of aggregates to a tightening of borrowing con-
straints in the benchmark GHH model and in the 
greater wealth inequality version of that model. 
Clearly, the same tightening of borrowing con-
straints has a much larger impact on output and 
employment in the greater wealth inequality 
1 We used  β = {0.36, 0.87, 0.96} and ω =  {0.30, 0.62, 0.08} 
for the fraction of agents of each type. 
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version. This result occurs because a greater 
number of agents are borrowing constrained in 
this version.
IV. Conclusion
We have shown that in a  cross section of US 
states, reductions in household credit were asso-
ciated with what a simple  representative-agent 
model of labor supply would interpret as evi-
dence of an increase in labor market distortions. 
A simple  Bewley-Aiyagari model can be made 
consistent with such facts, even in the absence of 
price or wage rigidities or constraints on mone-
tary policy, as long as housing and consumption 
enter in a  non-separable fashion in the  utility 
function. Whether such forces imply that a 
tightening of borrowing constraints is associated 
with a reduction in employment depends on the 
strength of wealth effects in the model. When 
wealth effects are large, as with standard pref-
erences, a tightening of borrowing constraints 
implies an increase in aggregate employment. 
With GHH preferences, there are no such wealth 
effects and a tightening of borrowing constraints 
predicts a decline in employment.
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